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Chasing One’s Tail: Some Reflections on the




Methodology is like a dog fascinated by the sight of its own tail.
Excitement mounts when the tail is in reach: The dog thinks, ‘Yes!
I’ve finally caught the bugger!’ Biting down, self-satisfaction quickly
turns to pain and the tail flicks away, the dog left pondering: ‘What
happened?’ Time passes, mistakes are forgotten and the chase begins
anew. This essay will offer a critique of the work of Jonathan Z
Smith, a figure held in high esteem by those who wish to revitalise
the comparative endeavour in religion in the face of what is broadly
labelled the postmodern critique.1 Despite the fact that Smith’s work
has been met with near universal praise,2 I argue that one should
show caution in reading it. While Smith does make worthwhile
contributions to the discipline, he deliberately subverts his claims
with statements such as ‘there is no data for religion’3 and ‘map is not
territory – but maps are all we possess’,4 expressing a deep anxiety
about the possibility of knowledge. Smith does not so much as
counter the postmodern critique but exacerbates it, teaching us that,
as students of religion, we have been chasing our tails all along.
                                                           
1 See Kimberly C Patton and Benjamin C Ray (eds) A Magic Still Dwells:
Comparative Religion in a Postmodern Age (Berkeley, 2000).
2 Or more precisely, it is because Smith’s work is met with near universal praise that
the reader should be wary. The only sustained criticism of which I am aware comes
from Hugh Urban. This essay is heavily indebted to two of his essays: Hugh B
Urban, ‘Making a Place to Take a Stand: Jonathan Z Smith and the Politics and
Poetics of Comparison’, Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 12:3, 2000. 339-
378 and ‘Power Still Dwells: The Ethics and Politics of Comparison in A Magic Still
Dwells’, Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 16:1, 2004, 24-35.
3 Jonathan Z Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago,
1982) xi.
4 Jonathan Z Smith, Map is not Territory (Chicago, 1978) 309.
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I will proceed by examining the dialogue between Mircea Eliade and
Smith, focusing on the problems that Smith inherits and his unusual
attempt at overcoming them. I suggest that the fundamental issue
Smith addresses in his engagement with Eliade is the question of how
theory can be methodologically responsible. This involves the
delicate issue of how to approach the elusive concept we call
‘religion’: what is the nature of our subject matter and how do we
bring ourselves into relation with it? Far from straightforward, such
questions are a source of much grief for the aspiring student of
religion; any proposed answer inevitably raises a further set of
problems.
Today, the ideological dimension of knowledge looms large; any
knowledge claim raises questions of moral and political significance.
Who is to gain and who is excluded? Who is speaking and from
where? Eliade is shadowed by a supposed complicity in extreme
right-wing politics.5 His defenders are accused of careerism and the
willful ignorance of evidence.6 These questions of moral and political
significance are interpreted in this paper as part of the wider problem
of historical self-reflexivity. How this problem is dealt with will, in
no small part, determine the future shape and direction of the
discipline of comparative religion.
Eliade’s Conception of the Sacred
The key component in Eliade’s work is his conception of the sacred.
According to Eliade, we are aware of the existence of the sacred
because it reveals itself to us, ‘appearing from without’, marking out
as distinct a time and a place. The time is primordial time, ‘in illo
tempore’. The place is the sacred centre, the locus of all creation. It is
the duty of homo religiosus to repeat and relive the sacred events of
in illo tempore through myth and ritual and, by doing so, to renew the
                                                           
5 See Adriana Berger, ‘Fascism and Religion in Romania’, The Annals of Scholarship
6:4, 1989, 455-465.
6 See Russell T McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis
Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia (New York, 1997).
Allan Sun
191
cosmic order. The sacred is the essential, irreducible element of
religion and is the rightful province for those who claim to study it.
History, by its very nature – transient, contingent, volatile – is
profane. It conceals the sacred in a process of desacralisation, where
what was once universal degenerates into the particular. This process
gives rise to the outward forms of religion with which we are
familiar: the signifiers that (mis)represent the signified. Eliade does
give some credit to the role of history when he states that ‘every
manifestation of the sacred takes place in some historical situation’7
and that the scholar must hold to the ‘historically concrete’.8 But
while it is possible to trace the historical development of religious
forms – we can only know of them as such – the object of the study
of religion is ultimately beyond historical reality, according to Eliade.
It is the task of phenomenology to complete the task history has
begun.
Achieving this transhistorical feat requires a special kind of
interpretation: a phenomenological method founded upon a
‘sympathetic imagination’9 and a ‘creative hermeneutic’.10 The
sympathetic imagination allows us to relive the myths and ritual of
the other like an actor who assumes the role of a character, not as
remote external forms, but from within. The results of this experience
are then juxtaposed against different phenomena, revealing the
universal pattern or archetype that underlies them. Manifestly
creative, Eliade’s method is closer to art than to science, a claim
which he  would not dispute.11  This  methodology is not creative tout
                                                           
7 Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (New York, 1958) 2.
8 Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, trans Willard R Trask
(New York, 1964) xv.
9 Mircea Eliade, The Symbolism of Evil (New York, 1967) 3.
10 Mircea Eliade, The Quest (Chicago, 1969) 65.
11 Eliade quotes American physicist Jacob Bronowski: ‘The step by which a new
axiom is addressed cannot itself be mechanized. It is a free play of the mind, an
invention outside of the logical process. This is the central act of imagination in
science, and it is, in all respects, like any similar act in literature’. Mircea Eliade,
Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts, ed Diane Apostolos-Cappadona (New York,
1986) 155.
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court, however. Eliade’s discoveries are objective, even while they
deal with revelations of a reality lost to our ordinary senses.
Through Eliade, the difficulties posed by our historical existence
come to the fore. History dictates what issues rise to salience at a
given time, the criteria by which things are judged to be true or
beautiful. But as circumstances change, so too do the criteria used to
make such judgments. History renders all things transient, obsolete.
Eliade was not ignorant of this, as many assume, but on the contrary
was all too aware. Science could not provide the eternal truths he was
looking for, its mode of acquiring knowledge based on the
observation of contingencies. A society ruled by appearances, he
held, is like a house built on sand. In order to avert the tragedy of
human finitude, Eliade posited the sacred: the transcendent ground of
all being, including time itself. He eschewed the methods of science
for those of intuition and religious experience, which he understood
to emanate directly from this transcendent source, providing
unmediated access to the secrets of the cosmos. Critics retort that this
is hardly the disinterested pursuit of knowledge that ought
characterise the academic enterprise; it is ‘covert theology’, a
‘religion after religion’.12 Claiming the existence of a totality no-one
could actually observe, Eliade’s method is dogmatic in its
propositions and unfalsifiable in its conclusions: the bugbears of bad
theory.
A second criticism commonly leveled against Eliade is that his
method has serious political and moral implications. There are two
interrelated aspects of this criticism. Firstly, it is claimed that a
substantial definition of religion is provided ipso facto, precluding the
possibility of alternative definitions and hence the recognition of
difference. This criticism is well-known as postmodernism’s
invective against grand narrative. Secondly, the particularities of
Eliade’s definition of religion also preclude difference. The sacred is
the essence of religion; it is a singular homogeneous substance from
which all being springs and to which humanity should return.
                                                           
12 See Steven Wasserstrom, Religion after Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea
Eliade, and Henri Corbin at Eranos (Princeton, 1999).
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Eliade’s comparisons are structurally weighted toward the similar.
Similarity unites and difference divides; therefore, difference is
degenerate and should be overcome. The other, no longer
characterised by its difference, turns out to be really just like us;
humanity is brought together under the fictive unity of h o m o
religiosus. This humanistic impulse too often endorses violence
against the truly different, against what does not fit the preconceived
worldview. This criticism identifies a latent ideological function
present in Eliade’s method. Exactly what this ideology involves
however is not the concern of this essay. Suffice it to say, it is not
difficult to see how the controversy over Eliade’s political affiliations
can be read as the flip side of his metaphysical speculation and denial
of difference.13
Smith’s Conception of Religion
For Smith, religion is one of the ways in which humans construct the
worlds of meaning in which they live; it provides the source of the
conviction that their existence matters. In Map is not Territory, Smith
invokes the metaphor of a map to illustrate this idea. Just as maps are
used to make sense of and to negotiate some territory, religion too
aims at making sense of and negotiating the world of lived
experience. It involves an ongoing process of application where the
expectations of tradition are constantly weighed against the demands
of life, where the correspondence between maps and territories is
assessed. When either side becomes asymmetrical with its other,
when the demands of life are such that tradition cannot cope, either
tradition must adapt or life must suffer. Religion is essentially
pragmatic, concerned with the here-and-now rather than the distant
past.
Smith extends these ideas to encompass the study of religion. It is a
way in which worlds of meaning are constructed, which again
provide the source of the conviction that the scholar’s existence
                                                           
13 See Ivan Strenski, Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth-Century History: Cassirer,
Eliade, Levi Strauss and Malinowski (London, 1987) Chapters 3 and 4.
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matters.14 The myth and ritual that constitute our data are not
intrinsically ‘religious’, supernatural or extraordinary; they are simply
the maps of others. Our choosing to label data as ‘religious’ is but an
instance of our own scholarly mapping strategies. The study of
religion is a creative enterprise where the scholar negotiates between
his or her conceptual frameworks and the data at hand, to see whether
they adequately make sense of, or ‘fit’, the data. Exactly what counts
as adequate or ‘fitting’ is, however, an open question, since
something can only be considered so with respect to an intended
purpose, a wider context. This context is provided by history.
Smith is dismissive of those who argue that there exists a stable
ground from which to interpret the world. The adequacy of a theory
cannot be measured in terms of objectivity, of the accuracy of a
representation to things ‘out there’ in the world.15 History precludes
this option; there is no fixed normative, political or ethical position in
relation to data:
The philosopher has the possibility of exclaiming with Archimedes: ‘Give me
a place to stand on and I will move the world’. There is, for such a thinker, at
least the possibility of a real beginning … a stand point from which he has
clear vision. The historian or the historian of religions has no such possibility.
There are no places on which he might stand apart from the messiness of the
given world. There is for him no real beginning, but only the plunge which he
takes at some arbitrary point to avoid the unhappy alternatives of infinite
regress or silence.16
To avoid the ‘infinite regress or silence’ suggested by historicism,
Smith argues that we must take the plunge at some ‘arbitrary point’.
                                                           
14 ‘What we study when we study religion is one mode of constructing worlds of
meaning, worlds within which men find themselves and in which they choose to
dwell … through the use of myths, rituals and experiences of transformation’. Smith,
Map is not Territory, 290-291.
15 ‘[I]t ceased to be axiomatic that the scholar’s … task was to represent accurately
what was ‘out there’. Most crucially, and across the board, the notion of a
determinate and unitary truth about the physical or social world, approachable if not
ultimately reachable, came to be seen by a growing number of scholars as a chime’.
Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American
Historical Profession (Cambridge, 1988) 523-524.
16 Smith, Map is not Territory, 129.
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This arbitrary point is the scholar’s position relative to the data,
arrived at through a creative ‘exercise in the strategy of choice’,17
with regard to the wider intellectual tasks at hand.18 In this manner,
theory is founded on the subject’s self-determining freedom and on
the uses to which it is put, rather than any necessary relation to the
world as it actually is: ‘there is no data for religion. Religion is solely
the creation of the scholar’s study’.19 Smith goes on to assert that
these constructed frameworks, religious or scholarly, never actually
fit the content. There exists a fundamental disjuncture between
thought and the world it aims to represent. Smith expresses this view
in his pithy statement: ‘map is not territory – but maps are all we
possess’.20 The disjuncture between map and territory, between
thought and reality, Smith labels ‘incongruity’. It is pivotal for his
methodology as a whole.
Incongruity is the unavoidable fact of our contingent (that is,
historical) existence. It is the irreconcilable gap between a
constructed reality and reality as it really is: in the case of religion,
between tradition and the exigencies of life; in the study of religion,
between our conceptual frameworks and the data at hand. Smith uses
the notion of incongruity to illustrate the absurdity of the human
condition: despite all our attempts at understanding the world, we will
always fall short. The flux of history causes human understanding to
be constantly on the back foot. It renders concepts, languages and
entire worlds obsolete, forcing us to construct newer ones better
suited to the emerging circumstances. Eliade perceived this as tragic
and chaotic. The continual redundancy of the old and manufacturing
of the new progressively alienates humanity from their paradisal past.
The sacred was Eliade’s attempt at stemming the tide of history,
bringing order and finality to our lives. While Smith endorses the
capacity of religion to organise experience, he asserts, against Eliade,
that there can be no finality. Within the context of history, finality
means oppression. Incongruity is a blessing in disguise, guarding
                                                           
17 Smith, Imagining Religion, 56.
18 ‘It is creativity in terms of how one’s choices are combined, compared, and
thought about – and to what end’. Ibid, 59.
19 Ibid, xi.
20 Smith, Map is not Territory, 309.
On a Panegyrical Note
196
against the excesses of dogmatic certainty and providing humans the
space in which they can freely carve the contours of their own
existence. Religion and the study of religion have an ironic quality:
the success of religion lies in its failure, in the oscillation between the
ideal and the real, theory and reality.21 An examination of how Smith
conceives myth will make this notion of incongruity clearer.
Myth is a ‘strategy for dealing with the situation’ that fails.22 It is a
kind of ‘self-conscious category mistake’, which plays upon the
incongruity between traditional modes of thought and the prevailing
historical circumstances. For example, Smith interprets the myth of
Hainuwele collected from the Wemale tribe of Ceram.23 Recorded in
1927, the myth tells of how the goddess Hainuwele or ‘Coconut Girl’
excretes a number of valuable and distinctly foreign articles: Chinese
porcelain dishes, metal knives, gold earrings and brass gongs. The
people became so jealous of her wealth that they kill and dismember
her, burying her body parts in the ground. From these body parts
grew a new type of plant that would become the tribe’s primary
source of food. Where Eliade would interpret this myth as the
archetypal cosmogonic sacrifice and dismemberment of the
primordial deity, Smith sees it in more practical terms, as an attempt
to reconcile the incongruity of the colonial encounter between the
indigenous peoples and the Europeans.
The situation faced by the natives was the erosion of the traditional
value systems, based on principles of exchange and reciprocity, when
confronted by the material wealth of the Europeans. The myth does
not resolve the incongruity of the situation: ‘the experiment was a
failure. The white man was not brought into conformity with native
                                                           
21 Smith draws heavily on Mary Douglas’ definition of the joke: ‘a play upon form,
which brings into relation disparate elements in such a way that one accepted pattern
is challenged by the appearance of another which is in some way hidden in the first…
the joke affords opportunity for realizing that an accepted pattern has no necessity.
Its excitement lies in the suggestion that any particular ordering of experience may be
arbitrary’. Mary Douglas, ‘The Social Control of Cognition: Some Factors in Joke
Perception’, Man 3:3, 1968, 365.
22 Smith, Map is not Territory, 299.
23 Smith, Imagining Religion, Chapter 6.
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categories, he still fails to recognize a moral claim of reciprocity’.24
But like the joke, riddle or metaphor, myth provides an occasion for
thought.
Smith presents a historically self-reflexive interpretation of the study
of religion, arguing that the human is homo faber,25 a post-Kantian
builder of worlds, and not homo religiosus. Smith’s method is
fundamentally anthropocentric, the concept of ‘religion’ being
understood from within our relationship to it, rather than from
outside. Eliade began with fully-formed objects external to the
individual, ready to be internalised and categorised. These objects are
hidden, but nonetheless there to be grasped. Smith begins with the
subject in an actively self-determining relation to the world and to
itself. Meaning and significance do not inhere in things themselves,
but are qualities we project onto them in an act of choice. There are
no ultimate standards of judgement, apart from those we endorse. It is
we who decide what is sacred, what counts as religion, how to
interpret data and the conclusions we want to reach. Making these
decisions is the interested subject, addressing concerns intelligible
only under certain historical conditions. As these conditions change,
so too must the concepts that are used to understand them. In this
sense, there exists a fundamental disjuncture between thought and
what it aims to represent. Rather than being a cause for concern,
however,  this disjuncture provides the space  required  for  difference
                                                           
24 Smith’s conclusion in full: ‘The Ceramese myth of Hainuwele … does not solve
the dilemma, overcome the incongruity or resolve the tension. Rather it provides the
native with an occasion for thought. It is a testing of the adequacy and applicability
of native categories to new situations and data. As such, it is preeminently a rational
and rationalizing enterprise, an instance of experimental method. The experiment
was a failure. The white man was not brought into conformity with native categories,
he still fails to recognize a moral claim of reciprocity. But this is not how we judge
the success of a science. We judge harshly those who have abandoned the novel and
the incongruous to a realm outside of the confines of understanding and we value
those who (even though failing) stubbornly make the attempt at achieving
intelligibility, who have chose the long, hard road of understanding’. Smith, Map is
not Territory, 307-308.
25 Ibid, 144.
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and the dynamism of thought. Religion’s power lies in the oscillation
between the ideal and the real.
Homo Faber vs Homo Religiosus
There is something comforting in Eliade’s forthrightness. He conjures
feelings of nostalgia for a time when one could say exactly what one
meant. This is no accident. Eliade proceeds from the assumption that
humans have unmediated access to objective reality, the
representations of which are not influenced by the historical location
of the subject. In a modern context, such claims to unmediated access
are usually grounded in a scientific method; in its place Eliade posits
his own transcendent foundation and a complementary hermeneutic.
The underlying assumption remains the same, however:
understanding consists in mastering the material circumstances26
under which one is entitled to use a concept. Theory must accurately
reflect reality. The correct application of concepts is constitutive of
truth and from the truth comes the good. In Eliade’s case, the truth is
the sacred; knowledge of it overcomes the dualism from which the
study of religion emerges, but from which science cannot escape.
Truth applies in all places and at all times. This is one way of
construing the logic behind Eliade’s definition of religion. The sacred
(content) identifies certain phenomena as ‘religious’ (concept).
Religion is substantial and sui generis.
The benefit of this approach is conceptual clarity; we know exactly
what concept applies to which content. The drawback of emphasising
the correct application of concepts is the unanticipated consequences
of their use. It is important to make this distinction because Smith
engages with Eliade only by addressing the consequences of concept
use, ignoring the antecedent conditions that determine how concepts
are applied in the first place. It needs to be determined how Smith
does this and how it affects his method. Smith claims, firstly, that the
substantial and monistic nature of Eliade’s truth denies difference
and,  secondly,  that a hermeneutic based on a transcendent grounding
                                                           
26 Material in its widest sense: thing-like; substantial.
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is unobservable and hence indisputable. Smith’s response to each of
these issues will be considered in detail.
Eliade offers a substantial definition of religion: this is what religion
is. Smith offers a more pragmatic assessment: this is what religion
does. Smith forfeits the idea of correct application, focusing on how
material circumstances permit the use of the concept ‘religion’. He
shifts the focus to the practical consequences of the use of the concept
‘religion’, its capacity to provide order and meaning. He reverses the
order of explanation: first comes the good and whatever is good is
true. What is gained over Eliade is that, by focusing on the
consequences of concept use, the scholar can tailor ‘religion’ to
explain a variety of different phenomena without having to reduce
them to a single substance. Religion becomes a dynamic, open-ended
concept capable of accounting for history and difference. This
approach is not without its difficulties, however.
Exactly what content is the concept of religion supposed to refer to?
For Eliade, it was the sacred. Smith’s conception of religion is
conspicuously vague. It is difficult to see what makes ‘religion’
special and how it may be differentiated from other ‘non-religious’
modes of human activity. Smith’s point is that religion is not sui
generis. There is nothing that distinguishes it from other modes of
human activity, apart from those aspects which we project onto it in
the service of our own interests. The concept ‘religion’ is drained of
its content. This is the significance of Smith’s claim that ‘there is no
data for religion’. The scholar is free to manipulate the concept to
serve whatever purpose he or she sees fit. However, this cannot be
entirely true; there are still restrictions on what one can and cannot do
with this concept.
Despite Smith’s attempt to make religion as inclusive as possible by
establishing a purely formal definition of religion, the substantive
commitment nevertheless remains. Smith is making the claim that
this is religion: the scholar must focus on historical context and not
search for a deeper, hidden meaning beneath the text. Wendy Doniger
raises the point: ‘To insist on historical context is therefore to deny
the power of the mythic or imaginal consciousness; it is yet another
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way to deny difference, to remain unmoved and in control’.27 Smith
anticipates this criticism. To maintain the recognition of difference,
Smith initiates the principle of erasure:28 the simultaneous assertion
and denial of content recast as the notion of incongruity.
Where Eliade establishes a transcendent grounding from which to
interpret the world, Smith asserts that no such grounding exists and so
shifts the locus of inquiry so that religion is understood from within
the subject’s relation to it, rather than from outside. Method becomes
immanent and observable, but now must reconcile the influence of
history on the interpretation of data. Smith’s response is that this
influence is irreconcilable. Theory will be forever incongruous with
reality. This is reflected in his conception of how religion, myth and
ritual operate. Myth is a strategy for dealing with a situation, a
strategy which ultimately fails. Ritual is the acting out of how things
ideally should be, in stark contrast to the way things actually are. The
power of religion lies precisely in its failure, in the oscillation
between the ideal and the real. And because the scholar also has no
place to stand, the study of religion must also operate on the premise
of incongruity.
Smith asserts the dynamism of history and the importance of
difference, but at the same time makes several universal value
judgments himself: the claim that humans are essentially homo faber
is one of them. Here Smith is engaging in the same sort of ‘deep’
speculation that he explicitly shuns. To avoid the apparent
contradiction, Smith falls back onto his notion of incongruity:
Smith’s own particular map, his own way of making sense of the
world, does not represent reality as it actually is. Eliade confused his
theory with reality, leading to the charges of essentialism,
homogeneity and so on. Smith’s claim that humans are homo faber is
an improvement over Eliade only if Smith posits some ultimate
objectivity that is beyond our reach, where the concept of homo faber
                                                           
27 Wendy Doniger, The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth (New York,
1998) 52.
28 The relation of Smith’s methodology to his cultural upbringing is noteworthy, just
as Eliade’s method is often related to his fascination with Eastern religions.
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does not apply. In other words, with Smith’s assertion comes its
simultaneous denial. When the critic is in need of something
substantial, Smith can point to homo faber.  When the critic is
skeptical, Smith can point to incongruity. He argues from one end to
the other – and then back again. Just as the success of religion is
founded on incongruity, the success of theory too lies in incongruity,
in the oscillation between theory and reality. This is undeniably a
clever strategy, but its effectiveness in addressing the concerns raised
by Eliade is negligible.
Smith is deliberately evasive about his own normative commitment.29
He writes: ‘I am an essayist, which makes me more elusive and
indirect than a writer of monographs. I tend to do my work in relation
to others. I tend not to speak my mind’.30 One cannot help but be
suspicious: what purpose does this withholding of information serve?
Smith does not give us a reason, but Sam Gill provides one for us. He
argues that Smith’s work is best understood as a form of ‘play’.31 Gill
reasons:
To take a stance, in this complex multi-cultural world, without recognizing its
absurdity is either religious, narrow-minded, or naïve. To refuse to take any
stance at all is either to indulge infinite regress, a favorite of many post-
modernists, or silence. The alternative, which is at least more interesting, is
the perspective of play: seriously taking a stance while acknowledging its
absurdity.32
                                                           
29 McCutcheon comments: ‘Those familiar with Smith’s work will no doubt agree
that he can, at times, be a bit cagey – not in the sense of being evasive, but in my
reading, in a profoundly strategic sense’. Russell T McCutcheon, ‘Relating Smith’,
The Journal of Religion 86:2, 2006, 292f. It is still evasive, even if it is strategically
so. Arguably, strategic evasion is worse than inadvertent evasion.
30 See the discussion of Jonathan Z Smith’s ‘The Domestication of Sacrifice’ in
Robert G Hammerton-Kelly (ed) Violent Origins: Walter Burkert, Rene Girard and
Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation (Stanford, 1988) 204.
31 ‘[C]omparison represents the academic field of play… the terms of comparison
and the comparative analysis are… the equipment or toys or moves by which the
academic plays’. Sam Gill, ‘No Place to Stand: Jonathan Z Smith as Homo Ludens,
The Academic Study of Religion Sub Specie Ludi’, Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 66:2, 1998, 206.
32 Gill, ‘No Place to Stand’, 306, emphasis added. In the footnote to the word
‘interesting’, Gill writes: ‘While I want to say “productive” or “promising”, I
recognise these terms depend upon the old values of moving towards truth and
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Although not explicitly Smith’s position, Gill reaches the only
conclusion that makes sense of the contradictions in Smith’s work,
while maintaining its intelligibility. Smith, however, declines to tie
off the various strands of his work in any conclusive way, knowing
full well that if he did, it would be self-defeating. This point seems
lost in Gill’s enthusiasm, not realising that the punchline has already
come and gone. There are a number of problems in Gill’s statement
that only serve to highlight the obliquity and ineffectiveness of
Smith’s method. The infinite regress or silence Gill attributes to
postmodernists is itself a stance. Claiming that we live in a ‘complex
multicultural world’ is itself a stance. The perspective of play,
‘seriously taking a stance, while acknowledging its absurdity’, is
itself a stance. The simple fact is: it is impossible to avoid taking a
stance no matter how cleverly you make out that you haven’t. To do
so is not ‘narrow-minded or naïve’. To believe that acknowledging
the absurdity of the situation somehow addresses the problem is.33
The ideological component in Smith’s work has not diminished but
simply changed. Hugh Urban comments: ‘… the real question is not
whether there are ties between the comparative study of religions and
the evils of colonialism or fascism; rather, the more troubling
question is whether it has ties to the economic and political interests
of the US in our times’.34 Smith’s argument is a case in point. Smith
envisages the human being as a free, self-reliant, creative and
resourceful individual, actively constructing the world in which they
live and constantly reinventing their own identities. Objective reality
has been forfeited and choice is introduced to take its place as the
locus of meaning. This is an appealing alternative, because the
recognition of choice is conducive to the recognition of difference,
giving the study of religion a kinder and more open appearance.35
But this is far from the case. Smith’s method does not respect
                                                                                                                             
reality’. No longer are things judged good or bad, beautiful or ugly, true or false,
useful or useless, but simply ‘interesting’, a terms which erases such distinctions.
33 I do not deny that one can be playful while being serious, but note that the
humanities have a harder time pulling it off than in the domain of the arts and
literature.
34 Urban, ‘Power Still Dwells’, 28.
35 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, 1992) 69.
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difference but rather neutralises it. Emptied of any determinate
meaning or content, religion is reduced to the superficial level of the
interesting and quaint. Smith at once confirms our alienation from the
world, while allowing us to participate through the endless
distractions of choice. To satisfy this demand, the study of religion
assumes an acquisitive character, where the worlds of others are
raided for raw materials, manufactured into harmless novelties and
consumed on the academic market. ‘There is no other’, Smith writes,
‘it is all what we see in Europe everyday’.36 He may as well have
added, ‘on the television, in the shopping mall and in our books’. The
irony of Eliade’s broadside against ‘bourgeois morality’ was that
Eliade himself is shown up to be thoroughly bourgeois. Smith not
only embraces it, but attributes it to humanity as a whole.
Conclusion
If the capacity for choice and judgment is fundamental to human life,
it cannot simply be reduced to the playing out of a purely subjective
will, without reference to an external world. The movement from
necessity to choice demands that we also inquire into the reasons
motivating our decisions. What makes this particular option better
than any other? A religion that advocates peace is preferable to one
that advocates violence. Smith’s method, however, gives little
indication as to how we are to decide between these, beyond the call
of individual taste. The concepts ‘play’, ‘absurdity’ and ‘incongruity’
are incapable of dealing with issues of ethical significance; yet these
are the issues that religion often concerns itself with, and what Smith
himself seems to address in his call for theory to recognise difference.
If life is absurd, why should we bother to recognise difference? Any
serious answer to this question cannot avoid making a value-laden,
ideological statements. Denial is not an option. We must accept this
fact so that we can better deal with its consequences.
This is ironic: the limitations of Smith’s method stem from the one-
sided emphasis on the consequences of concept use over the material
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circumstances of their deployment.37 This approach is flawed because
concepts do not simply ‘work’ in a vacuum; they are not groundless
or arbitrary, as Smith assumes. For a concept to work, it must in some
sense cohere with the norms and values preceding it. These norms
and values are not eternal. They do not issue from a transcendent
source or belong to the psychic unity of humankind. Rather they exist
in history, intersubjectively, between participants in a communal and
ongoing dialogue. This is the ground from which interpretations are
made. For this reason the scholar must make explicit the normative
commitments that underlie his or her judgments. Only when these
commitments are openly shared can they be endorsed or rejected,
subject to criticism, reflection and change. Bruce Lincoln, a scholar
who meets Eliade’s challenge more effectively than does Smith,
writes: ‘There is a significant political dimension to all religious
discourse, and … it is not only possible but important to render this
visible so that it may be subjected to critical analysis’.38 Making
explicit what is implicit guards against the reckless imposition of our
worldview upon others. The relationship between ourselves and
others must be one of reciprocity.
Instead of addressing the problem of our historical being and the
interested nature of thought directly, Smith hedges, hides and
oscillates, making assertions while denying them at the same time.
This strategy makes for fascinating reading, but tends to obscure
more than it clarifies. Smith’s methodology highlights the
inevitability of ideological commitment; it shows that the failure to
disclose risks the confusion of ideas, the tendency to mistake
something for what it is not. This is especially dangerous when those
ideas are supposed to represent the lives of others and when the warm
fuzz of self-satisfaction obscures the critical imperative. Smith urges
the scholar to be ‘relentlessly self-conscious’.39
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Inferentialism (Cambridge, 2000).
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(Chicago, 1991) 244.
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